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RATIONALE OF COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE*
by
ZIJIAN ZHANG**
In  the  market  for  information  goods,  externalities  occur  when  the  production
or consumption of literary and artistic works is not directly reflected in the market.
Economic  theories  regarding  the  creation  of  market  externalities,  the  causes
for market  failures,  and  the  correction  of  market  inefficiencies  provide  evidence
in support  of  retaining  the  copyright  system  as  the  means  of  correcting  these
market failures and inefficiencies and to encourage authorship. This approach can
also be adopted to analyze the system of collective management. This article aims
at analyzing the rationale of collective management system through an economic
approach.  The author  maintains that  collecting societies  are  effective  in dealing
with  the  complicated  process  of  rights  management,  license  granting
and remuneration distribution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
With  rapid  technological  development  and  substantial  reproducing  cost
reduction, more and more problems concerning copyright protection have
raised in recent years. For example, the widespread use of photocopying
machines, video and sound recorders could easily copy the original work
with  highly  identical  quality.  The  proliferation  of  Internet
and the subsequent  technologies  such  as  peer-to-peer  file  sharing,  made
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the reproduction  and  dissemination  of  music  available  worldwide  just
within  seconds.  Facing  this  increasingly  severe  piracy  issue,  diverse
industries in copyright are searching for new ways to prevent infringement.
These  developments  have  led  to  a  renewed  interest  in  collective  forms
of exercise of copyright.1
It is generally acknowledged that individual exercise of copyright is both
difficult – if not feasible – and expensive.2 On the one hand, authors find it
impossible  to  negotiate  terms with  every  user  who intends  to  use  their
works.  On  the  other  hand,  monitoring  costs  are  prohibitively  high.
Once they find infringement, the cost of enforcement can be much higher
than the royalty that they receive. With large number of users and works
involved, individual exercise of copyright cannot cover the costs of original
creation,  therefore,  authors  may find  creation  unmotivated,  thus leading
to the decrease of works supply. During this process, externality may occur.
In  economic  terms,  an  externality  is  the  uncompensated  impact  of  one
person’s  actions on the well  being of a bystander3 (to  make an example
that is  suitable  for  this  contribution,  unauthorized  reproduction
of intellectual goods). Because buyers and sellers neglect the external impact
of their own behaviors when deciding how much they would like to supply
and  demand,  the  market  equilibrium  would  not  be  efficient  under
the situation  in  which  externality  exists.4 In  other  words,  the  social
equilibrium does not achieve the benefit-maximizing level as a whole.
The  market  becomes  incapable  of  allocate  resources  efficiently
when market failure exists.  Market power and externalities are particular
instances  of  market  failure.5 It  is  suggested  that  there  are  three  reasons
for market  failure:  (1)  externalities,  nonmonetizable  interest,
and noncommercial  activities;  (2)  market  barriers  (prohibitively  high
transaction  costs);  and  (3)  anti-dissemination  motives.6 For  the  purpose
of this contribution, I will discuss the first two in the following sections.
1 Hollander, A 1984, “Market Structure and Performance in Intellectual Property: The Case
of Copyright Collectives” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 2, pp. 199, 200.
2 Ficsor, M 2002, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Publication, 16.
3 Mankiw, NG 2007, Principles of Economics, 4th edn, Cengage Learning Asia Pte, Ltd. 204.
4 Ibid.
5 Id 154.
6 Gordon,  WJ  1982,  “Fair  Use  as  Market  Failure:  A  Structural  and  Economic  Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors”, Columbia Law Review vol. 82, pp. 1627-35.
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Collective  management of copyright  could be seen as  a positive  way
to deal with copyright licensing.7 Under this regime, collective management
organizations  (CMOs)  are  societies  to  which  authors  of  creative  works
authorize  their  copyrights.  The  process  of  copyright  licensing  can  be
described  as  followed:  firstly,  potential  users  of  copyrighted  works
negotiate with CMOs and make an agreement; secondly, users are granted
a license  and  pay  the  agreed  royalties  whereas  CMOs  distribute  them
to their  members  after  deducting  administrative  costs;  finally,  CMOs
oversee the use of the works in their repertory and take legal actions where
necessary.
Economic  literature  has  long  been  debating  the  rationale  of  CMOs
from differing  perspectives  (e.g.  transaction  costs,  monopoly
and competition, and social welfare), especially seeing CMOs as an efficient
way of overcoming the problem of high transaction cost for administering
copyright  in  some  markets.8 For  instance,  Hollander  suggests  that
the formation of a collective leads to an increase in the number of works
being  produced.9 He  also  believes  that  the  statutes  of  collectives  can
guarantee  the  access  to  the  society  and  the  distribution  of  revenue.10
In addition, in a detailed survey performed by Besen, Kirby and Salop, they
propose  that  a  closed  collective  produces  fewer  than  the  economically
efficient  number  of  songs11 whereas  efficient  negotiation  between
the monopoly  collective  and  user  groups  may  eliminate  any  incentive
for competitive entry.12 When administrative costs are small, they argue that
competition among collectives may result.13 Besides transaction costs issue,
Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen explore the impact  of digital  rights
management (DRM) on collective management and conclude that DRM can
be  utilized  as  a  complement  of  CMOs rather  than the  end of  collective
management.14
7 Ficsor (N 2) 16.
8 Handke, C & Towse, R 2007, “Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies”,  International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 38, no. 8, pp. 938.
9 Hollander (N 1) 212.
10 Id 213.
11 Besen, SM, Kirby, SN & Salop, SC 1992, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives”
Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, pp. 394.
12 Id 398.
13 Id 403.
14 Hansen, G & Schmidt-Bischoffshausen, A 2007, “Economic Funtions of Collecting Societies -
Collective  Rights  Management  in  the  light  of  Transaction  Cost  -  and  Information
Economics”, GRUR Int. vol. 6, pp. 461.
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On  the  other  hand,  some  commentators  also  argued  that  collective
management organizations  often fail  to  live  up to their  potential  during
rights management, as they share the characteristics of serving their own
interests  at  the  expense  of  artists  and  the  public.15 Among  the  many
deficiencies  of  collective  management  organizations,  corruption
and mismanagement  are  most  common  seen.  For  example,  such
misbehaviors  of  CMOs  can  be  found  in  numerous  jurisdictions  ranged
from the  most  developed  countries  to  economically  less  developed
nations.16 Additionally, there is often a time difference between a licensee
paying  and an artist  receiving  his  money,  which  is  particularly  the case
in international markets.17 Some rights holders also complain that they only
receive  neglectable  royalties  as  a  result  of  excessive  overhead  expense
and unfair  distribution  mechanism.18 Critique  also  concentrates
upon the blanket licenses offered by CMOs in two aspects:
“(1)  the  supracompetitive  cartel  pricing  of  the  blanket  license  requires
broadcasters to devote more time to advertising, which in turn allows less
airtime  for  the  performance  of  songs  by  lesser-known  artists;  and  (2)
the blanket  licenses  eliminate  price  competition  between  songwriters,
thereby  encouraging  broadcasters  to  play  the  most  popular  songs,
and royalties to flow to the most popular songwriters.”19
15 Band, J & Butler,  B 2013, “Some Cautionary Tales about Collective Licensing”,  Michigan
State University College Law International Law Review, vol. 21, pp. 689.
16 Examples  include  corruption  in  Brazilian,  Spanish,  Ghanaian  societies,  see  Gorini,  A,
“Brazilian Collection Society under Scrutiny”, 
<http://entertainmentlawbrazil.com.br/2012/05/02/brazilian-collection-society-under-
scrutiny/>. Enigmax, “Music Rights Groups Raided by Police, Bosses Arrested for Fraud”,
<https://torrentfreak.com/music-rights-group-raided-by-police-bosses-arrested-for-fraud-
110702/>.  Schultz,  MF  &  Gelder,  AV  “Creative  Development:  Helping  Poor  Countries
by Building Creative Industries”,
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1338194>.
17 Band & Butler (N 15) 693.
18 For example, in an article the Canadian professor Michael Geist estimated that the average
distribution to authors based on one licensing scheme was $319. Among its $33.7 million
revenue in 2011, only $7.8 million was left to distribute to rights holders. The remaining was
allocated to administrative costs,  foreign CMOs compensation and ongoing legal battles.
Geist, M “The Economics Behind Access Copyright”, 
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2011/05/economics-of-access-copyright/>.
19 Reidel,  I  2011,  “The  Taylor  Swift  Paradox:  Superstardom,  Excessive  Advertising
and Blanket Licenses”, New York University Journal of Law & Business, vol. 7, pp. 755.
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However, without alternative to the blanket license rights holders have
no way to impose market discipline on CMOs by walking away or trying
new models.20
Despite the fact that CMOs are under various criticisms they still present
favorable  advantages  in  rights  management,  which  will  be  discussed
in the article. This article is organized as follows. Section II illustrates that
externalities  exist  in  the  copyright  regime.  As  a  consequence,  there
is the possibility that users will free ride on copyrighted works. CMOs thus
provide copyright holders with enough protection so that they are capable
of internalize these negative externalities. Section III deals with transaction
costs issue.  There are three types of transaction costs (search,  bargaining
and  enforcement  costs)  that  make  both  the  right  holders  and  users
overburden while they are dealing with copyright license. It is suggested
that  CMOs  is  one  of  the  best  solutions  that  can  reduce  these  costs
and facilitate the license process. Section IV claims that in some jurisdictions
there  is  only  one  CMO  in  one  particular  type  of  works  so  monopoly
emerges.  In order  to  limit  the  abuse  of  monopolistic  position  by CMOs,
governmental intervention is needed. Section V concludes.
2.  COLLECTIVE  MANAGEMENT  ORGANIZATIONS  IN  THE
FACE OF EXTERNALITIES
The aim of copyright protection – to incentivize creation and to facilitate
the dissemination of knowledge – is somewhat difficult to realize because
of the  public  good  aspect  of  intellectual  goods.  Thus  striking  a  perfect
balance  between  access  to  copyrighted  works  and  prevent
from unauthorized license has been the pursuit  of copyright laws. Before
delving  into  further  discussion  of  externalities,  we  have  to  first  of  all
understand authors’  incentives  of creation with and without  a copyright
protection  from  a  cost-benefit  respect  because  it  is  highly  relevant
to the issue of public goods.
2.1 WHY AUTHORS CREATE 
An economic analysis  of  copyright  protection shows that copyright  laws
arise as the result of the fact that the cost of creating a work is high whereas
the cost of reproducing it is relatively low.21 It is suggested that two costs
20 Band & Butler (N 15) 704.
21 Landes,  WM  &  Posner,  RA  1989,  “An  Economic  Analysis  of  Copyright  Law”,  Journal
of Legal Study, vol. 18, pp. 326.
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involved in the creating of intellectual goods (“cost of expression” and “cost
of reproduction” respectively).22 The first one includes the time and effort
that authors spend on original creation as well as the cost to the publisher
of editing  the  work.23 The  second  cost  includes  the  costs  of  printing,
binding,  and  distributing  copies  of  the  work.24 Intellectual  goods
(such as music  and  stories)  must  be  processed  into  physical  forms
(“fixation”  as  we call  it)  before  we  could consume them because  unlike
physical products, intellectual goods are not in and of themselves physical
commodities.  Therefore, these costs vary with the number of reproduced
goods increases.25
Note that one of the ultimate objectives that an author creates is to fulfill
his economic goal.26 Under the current copyright regime, the decision that
whether or not the author is to create new intellectual goods is dependent
on the fact that whether the author knows what the demand for the work
would  be.27 It  means  that  the  author  must  compare  between  the  cost
of expression and the difference between the profits of selling intellectual
goods  and the  cost  of  reproducing  them.28 Therefore,  a  corollary  is  that
the author  will  continue  to  reproduce  his  works  until  the  marginal  cost
of reproducing  one  more  copy  exceeds  the  marginal  revenue.29 Only
the author can cover the cost of his creation, including a reasonable return
on fixed-cost investment, will he continue to produce more work.
Then we will analyze the incentive to create in the absence of copyright
protection.  Suppose  a  world  without  copyright  protection,  as  under
a copyright  regime,  the  author  will  still  have  to  consider  the  cost
of expression,  the  cost  of  making  copies,  and  the  expected  revenue.30
Because  the  cost  of  reproducing  of  a  work  is  so  low  and  the  way
of disseminating it is numerous, whereas the cost of negotiating the terms
of use with the creator and receiving the license is so high, free riding will
emerge.  A  free  rider  is  a  person  who  receives  the  benefit  of  a  good
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. Also see Taylor, A 2007-2009, “Defeating Market Failure: Creating Successful Markets
by Encouraging Market Creation by Individual Copyright Holders”,  Adelphia Law Journal,
vol. 16, pp. 41.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Landes and Posner (N 21) 326.
27 Id 327.
28 Ibid.
29 Taylor (N 23) 41.
30 Landes and Posner (N 21) 326.
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but avoids paying for it.31 It is understandable that if a potential customer
believes that he can obtain a product for free he is unlikely to pay anything
for it.32 For the sake of the author’s interest, of course he could market his
work at a price that is close to the marginal cost of his creation, he could
not, however, reclaim the cost of his effort in this way. On the other hand,
the ability that an author controls his intellectual product is relatively weak
comparing  with  those  physical  products.  This  leads  to  the  fact  that
the producers  of  such goods can reproduce and sell  them at  a low cost;
it means  that  those  producers  who  do  not  pay  the  author  could  price
the goods  cheaper  than  those  who  do  pay  royalty  to  the  author.
The existence  of  free  riding  does  discourage  the  author  from producing
works  because  the  cost  of  expression  is  likely  to  exceed  the  difference
between the profits of selling and the cost of reproduction.
2.2 THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC GOODS 
The existence of free riding stems from the presence of public goods. Even
with  the  existence  of  copyright  system,  it  is  known  that  the  actual
production as well  as consumption of intellectual  goods would be lower
than the ideal level. This underproduction and underconsumption is also
the  result  of  public  goods  as  well.  Copyright  products  have  long  been
considered  as  public  goods.  A  public  good  features  neither  excludable
nor rival in consumption.33 Non-excludability means that a person cannot
be  prevented  from  using  the  good.  Because  it  is  rather  difficult
and expensive to prohibit users from free riding, public goods usually will
be under-produced if left to the private market.34 Non-rivalry is the state
that one person’s utilization cannot diminish other people’s use. As a result,
consumers who would like to consume a public good should be allowed
to consume it so long as they are willing to pay the costs of reproduction.
Once a copyrighted good is  produced,  it  is  subject  to  the characteristics
of public goods. It is generally acknowledged that common resources can be
depleted  if  overuse  occurs.  The  reason  for  that  is  that  there  is  no  cost
to society in letting an individual consume a unit of a non-rivalrous good,
31 Mankiw (N 3) 226.
32 Gordon, WJ 1991-1992, “Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual
Property” University of Dayton Law Review, vol. 17, pp. 854.
33 Mankiw (N 3) 224.
34 Gordon (N 6) 1611.
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since there is no diminution in the possible consumption choices of anyone
else.35
Books and music, as well as other copyrightable goods, exhibit certain
public  goods  characteristics.36 Once  the  content  of  the  work  is  made
available  to  the  public,  the  sequence  of  the  word as  well  as  the  rhyme
of the composition can be used by numerous users while one single use will
not exhaust the use of others. At the same time, no one is entitled to deprive
the right to use a work by others (no matter in whatever forms). As a result,
physical  control  of  intellectual  goods  proves  less  efficient  in  terms
of preventing free riding than that of tangible goods.37
Another highly relevant issue in the face of non-rivalrous goods is that
there  is  no  practical  mechanism  that  will  produce  the  ideal  number
of reproductions  for  any  given  title.38 In  other  words,  public  goods  are
expected to be produced at a level that is lower than the socially ideal one.
Note  that  every  product  that  has  a  value  that  is  higher  than  its  costs
of production  will  be  produced in  an  ideal  world.39 As a  matter  of  fact,
however, no any single producer is capable of appropriating the full benefit
of  the  good.  This  is  so  because  different  consumer  values  the  price
of the good differently, resulting in the fact that those who value the price
of the good lower than their expectation would not consume. Consequently,
some intellectual products will not be produced.40 Albeit the establishment
of collective management system was somewhat fortuitous,  if  not totally
ignorant about the above issues, it is designed for the goal of overcoming
the inherent drawbacks of public goods.
Market failure also results from the presence of free riding.41 According
to Wendy J. Gordon, market failure first occurs when there is no legal rule
that  requires  copyists  to  seek  permission  and  pay  license  fees.42
With the presence  of  a  copyright  law  and  some  other  rules  prohibiting
unauthorized users from copying, free riding would be excluded to some
35 Liebowitz,  S  2005,  “MP3s  and Copyright Collectives:  a  Cure Worse Than the Disease?”
in Takeyama, LN, Gordon, WJ & Towse, R (eds.), Developments in the Economics of Copyright:
Research and Analysis Edward 
36 Gordon (N 6) 1611.
37 Ibid.
38 Liebowitz (N 35) 44.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Lemley,  MA  2004-2005,  “Property,  Intellectual  Property,  and  Free  Riding”,  Texas  Law
Review, vol. 83, pp. 1032.
42 Gordon (N 32) 854.
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extent.  This  is  particularly  important  because  with  more  and  more  free
riders, authors find production increasingly unmotivated and thus decrease
the amount of works they produce. Subsequently, the supply of these goods
drops – while the demand curve remains the same, leading to the decrease
of  the  total  surplus.  This  fall  in  total  surplus  is  also  a  deadweight  loss
because it results from a market distortion.
2.3  CMOS’  PRICE  DISCRIMINATION  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FACE
OF PUBLIC GOODS 
Traditional  economic  literature  contends  that  taxation  and  government
provision might  provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of public
goods.43 That is to say that government can provide the public good or pay
for  it  with  tax revenue if  the  government  decides  that  the  total  benefits
of a public  good  exceed  its  costs.44 Nonetheless  this  approach  is
inappropriate for much intellectual property.45 Freedom of expression is the
main core of copyright creation, once it  is  compromised to governmental
reprisal, there is a danger of lacking democracy.46 Moreover, Governmental
subsidy  might  be  arbitrary.  Government  might  tend  to  subsidize  those
works of much utilization such as those of a scientific nature.47
Another  effective  approach in  order  to  offset  the negative  externality
that public goods bring is to price discriminate consumers. Before we begin
our discussion of this issue, note that first of all price discrimination is not
possible  when  a  good  is  sold  under  a  competitive  market  because
in a competitive  market,  goods  are  sold  at  the  market  price.48
In a competitive  market,  the  producer  will  determine  the  uniform  price
on the  basis  of  his  marginal  cost  of  producing  one  more  product.
Once the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue, he will set this market
price so that consumer demand will equal his output.49 Price discrimination
- with which a profit-maximizing producer with market power will set his
price at a level that is higher than his marginal cost,50 however, is a rational
43 Gordon (N 6) 1611.
44 Mankiw, NG 2009, Principles of Economics, 5th edn. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, pp. 228.
45 Gordon (N 6) 1612.
46 Ibid.
47 Tyerman, BW 1970-1971, “The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published
Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer”, UCLA Law Review, vol. 18, pp. 1117.
48 Mankiw (N 44) 326.
49 Lunney,  Jr.,  GS  2007-2008,  “Copyright’s  Price  Discrimination  Panacea”,  Harvard  Journal
of Law & Technology, vol. 21, pp. 396.
50 Ibid.
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strategy  for  a  monopolist.51 That  is,  by  selling  goods  at  a  price  closer
to the willingness to pay by different customers - or even charge a single
consumer a different price for each unit purchased,52 a price-discriminating
monopolist  could  be  selling  more  products  than  with  a  single  price.53
No doubt that different consumer values the price of a product differently,
they only make the decision of consuming when they value the product
higher than the reservation price of it. By pricing differently, the producer
aims  at satisfying  the  demand  of  differing  consumers  in  the  hope
of eliminating free riding to some extent.  A corollary to this is  that price
discrimination could thus raise social welfare because price discrimination
has the potential  of  increasing not only the profits  of producers but  also
the circulation of intellectual goods.54 In other words, price discrimination is
Pareto  efficient  when  a  monopolist  exists  and  thus  eliminates
the deadweight loss associated with uniform pricing.55
The licenses granted by CMOs are a typical type of price discrimination.
Traditional speaking, a CMO grant three types of licenses, per use contracts,
per  program contracts,  and blanket  licenses.56 A per  use  contract  targets
those  users  who  intend  to  use  a  work  for  a  single  time.  Every  time
utilization is made, a specific royalty payment would be followed. Under
per program contract, however, once the terms of the contract are made,
an individual work or classes of works could be utilized for unlimited time.
On  the  other  hand,  blanket  licensing  is  described  as  a  “bundle
of copyrights”,57 which does not allow users to select among works.58 Once
a blanket license is granted, users are entitled to unlimited use all the works
available  in  the  repertory  of  the  CMOs.59 Collecting  societies  typically
charge users a royalty from a tariff  of elaborate categories  (e.g.,  the size
of the  premises,  the  audience,  and  the  purpose  of  the  utilization).60
51 Mankiw (N 44) 327.
52 Lunney (N 49) 396.
53 Mankiw (N 44) 327.
54 Hollander (N 1) 203.
55 Lunney (N 49) 397.
56 Id 202.
57 Watt, R 2000, Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes?, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.,
pp. 191.
58 Hollander (N 1) 202.
59 A detail of the economics of blanket licensing will be discussed in the following sections.
60 Handke and Towse (N 8) 942. Also see Matsumoto, S 2002, “Performers in the Digital Era:
Evidence from Japan”, in Towse, R (ed.), Copyright in the Cultural Industries, Edward Elgar,
pp. 196-209.
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Moreover, they will also analyze the willingness and ability to pay by users
on the basis of the information and data (concerning the number of uses
and  the  value  generated)  collected  to  evaluate  their  license  fees.61 Price
discrimination by CMOs thus eliminates the number of potential users that
would be excluded from purchasing a license because of a uniform license
fee  that  would  be  more  expensive  than  their  reservation  price.62
Under perfect price discrimination, which means that the producer knows
exactly the willingness to pay of each consumer and charges each consumer
a differing  price,63 no  user  would  thus  be  excluded  from  licensing.
As a result of the fact that surplus transfers from consumers to producers
(i.e., right holders and CMOs), price discrimination shows up as the entire
surplus derived from the market goes to the producer in the form of profit
without any deadweight loss.64
Although  perfect  price  discrimination  does  not  exist  in  real  world
because of the costly information that is needed to process,  digital rights
management  (DRM) technologies  employed by  CMOs  nevertheless  help
solve this problem. DRM systems are designed to control access to and use
of  digital  content  such  as  video,  music,  or  computer  software.65
By implementing  DRM  technologies,  CMOs  are  able  to  assess  the  use
of individual  works  much  more  precisely  and thus  make more  accurate
predictions  upon  the  preference  of  different  works.  It  is  enabled
by encryption techniques that allow right holders to record and track down
the behaviors of the users.  This helps the pricing of differentiated works
and  further  facilitates  price  discrimination.  It  should  also  help  improve
the process of market signaling so that supply would be more tightly linked
to paying consumers tastes.66 In addition, the “menu costs” (that is, the costs
accrued through a price change)67 are reduced since price change is based
on a more reasonable calculation, which also facilitates price discrimination.
To summarize, by managing the works in their repertoire collectively,
CMOs  indirectly  strengthens  right  holders’  control  of  their  works.
61 Handke and Towse (N 8) 942.
62 Ibid.
63 Mankiw (N 44) 328.
64 Ibid. Also see Lunney (N 49) 398.
65 Katz,  A 2006,  “The Potential  Demise  of  Another Natural  Monopoly:  New Technologies
and the  Administration  of  Performing  Rights”,  Journal  of  Competition  Law  &  Economics,
vol. 2, pp. 248.
66 Handke and Towse (N 8) 949.
67 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 470.
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As a matter  of  fact,  managing  intangible  property  rights  is  much  more
difficult  than  their  tangible  counterparts.  Once  the  form  and  content
of the work  is  publicized,  it  can  be  utilized  by  differing  subjects  under
specific circumstance. Depending on their wide range representative ability
and  influential  market  power,  collecting  societies  grant  various  types
of licenses to large number of users on the basis of the collection of right
holders and their creations as many as possible. This to some extent meets
the end need of right holders, whose demand and willingness is to publicize
and  take  necessary  control  of  their  products  in  order  to  make  full  use
of their  products.  From  this  perspective,  collective  management
of copyright internalizes one of the externalities of copyright management.
In addition, as mentioned above, the contrast between the very high cost
of creation and the relatively low cost of reproduction breeds free riding,
which in return harms the enthusiasm of copyright holders and damages
the  infrastructure  of  copyright  system.  Things  may  become  even  worse
in digital  era  since  dissemination  of  pirated  copies  is  rampant  all  over
the world.  The  existence  of  CMOs,  however,  prevents  the  out-of-order
utilization  of  copyrighted  works  and  at  the  same  time  ensures  their
publicness by granting various licenses and by collecting different license
fees confronting different users and different purposes. As a consequence,
with free riding being eliminated to a large extent,  the economic interest
of copyright holders is protected and the total surplus increases.
3.  COLLECTIVE  MANAGEMENT  ORGANIZATIONS  IN  THE
FACE OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Economists  always  see  CMOs  as  an  efficient  way  of  overcoming
the problem of high transaction costs for administering copyright in some
markets.68 In order to measure the transaction costs involved in copyright
management,  one  must  initially  define  and  critically  appreciate
the theoretical basics of the transaction cost approach as well as the concept
of transaction costs.69
3.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND OF TRANSACTION COSTS
When it comes to transaction cost, one cannot ignore the great contributions
presented  by  Nobel  Prize  winner  Ronald  H.  Coase.  In  his  thought
68 Handke and Towse (N 8) 938.
69 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 464.
2016] Z. Zhang: Rationale of Collective Management Organizations ... 85
provoking essays “The Nature of the Firm” in 193770 and “The Problem
of Social  Cost”  in  196071,  Coase  laid  the  foundation  of  transaction  cost
approach. According to the Coase theorem, if  private parties can bargain
without cost over the allocation of resources, they can solve the problem
of externalities  on  their  own.72 In  other  words,  one  must  assume  that
on the basis  of  missing  transaction  costs,  private  negotiations  will  lead
to a more  efficient  allocation  of  resources  than  state  interventions.73
In the real world, however, costs will  accrue in every transaction because
in order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover various
information concerning both parties of the transaction. For example, Coase
suggests that one has to “discover who it is that one wishes to deal with,
toìinform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms,  to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake
the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being
observed,  and  so  on.  These  operations  are  often  extremely  costly,
sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be
carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”74
When transaction costs are high enough to prevent bargaining, the efficient
use of resources will depend on how property rights are assigned.75
If  the  transaction  costs  are  so  high  that  they  exceed  the  benefit
of contracting, then the reasonable person will choose not to carry out this
transaction. There is no doubt that cooperation creates more benefits than
non-cooperative  actions,  because  each  side  will  benefit  to  some  extent.
However, when transaction costs are taken into consideration, both sides
in the contract have to make sure that their potential cooperative benefits
exceed the costs accrued. Otherwise, no transaction could be made under
the  context  in  which  a  homo  oeconomicus  pursues  profit-maximizing
strategy. Therefore, the level of transaction costs plays an important role
in individual negotiation and enforcement of contract, whereby individual
achievement of transaction facilitates the efficiency of the society as a whole.
The aim of transaction costs analysis is  to identify possible ways of cost
saving  so  that  parties  can  reduce  the  costs  induced  in  the  making
70 Coase, RH 1937, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, vol. 4, pp. 386.
71 Coase, RH 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, pp. 1.
72 Mankiw (N 3) 210.
73 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 464.
74 Coase (N 71) 15.
75 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th Edition Pearson, pp. 89.
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of agreement.76 In terms of collective management of copyright, transaction
costs  analysis  attempts  to  facilitate  the  identification  of  right  holders
and potential users, the negotiation of terms and licenses, the enforcement
of contracts,  the collection and distribution of royalties,  and if  necessary,
the litigation of infringement. It makes sure that the access to copyrighted
works and the dissemination of knowledge move smoothly so that the goal
of copyright law achieved.
Professor Oliver  Williamson introduces three specific  criteria  in  order
to evaluate the level of transaction costs: (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency
with  which  transactions  recur,  and  (3)  the  degree  to  which  durable,
transaction-specific  investments  (asset  specificity)  are  required  to  realize
least  cost  supply.77 In  most  market  transactions,  uncertainty  results
from the information  situation  regarding  the  contractual  partner
or the details of the contract78 while frequency can be characterized as one-
time, occasional, and recurrent.79 Note that the more information required to
be discovered (as the result  of  the larger  market  and the more dynamic
social  context),  the  more  costs  accrued  by  this  transaction.  Williamson
particularly points out that items that are specialized among users (i.e. asset
specific)  pose more hazards as buyers under this circumstance find them
more difficult  to  turn to alternative  sources  and sellers  cannot  sell  their
goods intended for one buyer to other buyers without difficulty.80
3.2 CATEGORIES OF TRANSACTION COSTS
There  are  three  types  of  transaction  costs  incurred  corresponding
to the development of an exchange:  (1)  search costs,  (2)  bargaining costs,
and (3) enforcement costs.81
Search costs accrue in the soliciting of a potential contracting partner.82
Generally  speaking,  search  costs  tend  to  be  high  for  unique  goods
or services,  and  low  for  standardized  goods  or  services.83 The  number
76 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 464.
77 Williamson, OE 1981, “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach”,
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87 No.3, pp. 555. Williamson, OE 1979, “Transaction-
cost  Economics:  The Governance  of  Contractual  Relations”, Journal  of  Law & Economics,
vol. 22, pp. 246.
78 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 466.
79 Williamson (1979) (N 77) 246.
80 Williamson [1981] (N 77) 555.
81 Cooter and Ulen (N 75) 91.
82 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 464.
83 Cooter and Ulen (N 75) 92.
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of copyright holders is numerous. Comparing with it, however, the number
of  copyrighted works can be  much larger  because  each author probably
creates more than one work. The idiosyncrasy of copyrighted works makes
the boundary of each work difficult to define because original expression is
another thing that is without clear definition. As a result, observers often
infringe copyrighted works by mistake. Thanks to copyright laws, which do
not  require  owners’  exhaustive  description  of  copyrighted  goods,
this to some extent lowers the search costs on observers. However, the fact
that  potential  users  will  still  need  to  learn  about  the  attributes
of an intellectual  good to avoid infringing  it,84 and to determine  whether
they want to enter into negotiations with the property owner over it 85 will
accrue  costs  as  well,  e.g.  opportunity  costs  such  as  determining  not  to
contract with another right holder. Potential users must also make second-
order decisions regarding how much information to collect before making
decisions regarding the good.86 Because there is myriad number of works
available, users have to find appropriate licensors and make contact with
them so that following negotiation can proceed, especially when authors are
hardly known or anonymous, this licensee might confront with even more
search costs. On the other hand, the search costs incurred by right holders
can also be prohibitively high. Once a potential user conveys the intention
to negotiate an agreement, information about him and his conditions have
to be tracked down. Through the time and money spent on collecting this
information,  there is  possibility  that  subsequent  establishment  of  contact
will  occur.87 In  addition,  informed  costs  have  to  be  calculated  carefully.
Laws  require  owners  that  they  are  obliged  to  disclose  appropriate
information  about  their  goods  (e.g.,  such  information  include  the  serial
number  of  the  book,  the  personal  information  about  the  author,  etc.,
through  advertisements  available  on  broadcast  or  Internet).  Moreover,
in case  that  third party  users  use  the  works protected by copyright  law
illegally,  right  holders have to spend money on detecting infringed uses
so that they are able to claim compensation, and where necessary, law suits.
When  the  contracting  parties  have  been  located,  bargaining  costs
accrued  for  the  negotiation  and  concluding  of  the  contract.  The  terms
84 Long, C 2004, “Information Costs in Patent and Copyright”,  Virginia Law Review, vol. 90,
pp. 476.
85 Ibid.
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of the contract such as the date of delivery, payment, and after-sale service
are the costs of drawing up a contract.88 Generally, negotiations tend to be
simple  and  easy  when  information  about  the  threat  values
and the cooperative solution is public.89 However, this may not be the case
in copyright regime because many of the information tend to be private,90
i.e.  the seller  of  copyrighted product  knows a lot more about its  hidden
information than the buyers know, whereas the buyer knows a lot more
about  his  or  her  ability  to  obtain  financing  than  the  seller  knows.91
This requires the parties of negotiation convert the private information into
public  information  before  computing  reasonable  terms  for  cooperation92
and thus costs accrued. To facilitate the negotiation, the parties may divulge
some of the information they have. But for the sake of their own interest,
it is impossible for them to divulge all because keeping some information
private  does  matter  during  negotiating  a  contract.  Keeping  the  balance
of public and private information is therefore expensive.
Generally  speaking,  most  of  the  contracts  only  concern  two  parties.
Negotiating terms between two parties is usually easy and cheap in terms
of  distance.  However,  many  bargains  involve  three  or  more  parties,
especially in the copyright industry because rights are dispersed in this area
(e.g.  a  user  has  to  negotiate  with  performer,  composer  and  lyricist
before being  granted  a  user  license,  things  become  even  more  difficult
if there  exist  co-authors).  This  characteristic  of  copyrighted  products
increases  the  costs  of  negotiation  exponentially.  What’s  more,  the  costs
of drafting the specific terms in an agreement are costly since they require
the anticipation of many contingencies that can arise to change the value
of the  bargain.93 In  particular,  agreement  on  terms  concerning  the  price
of products – which are dependent mainly on the supply and demand curve
of this product - is especially difficult to achieve.
Enforcement costs are costs accrued in order to ensure the agreement is
fulfilled.  One party must  keep watching  the other  to  make sure  that  he
keeps his  promise.  In other  words,  the execution of the contract  follows
88 Harrison, JL & Theeuwes, J 2008, Law & Economics, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., pp. 91.
89 Cooter and Ulen (N 75) 92.
90 Ibid.  Keeping  the  information  public  means  that  both  parties  know each  other’s  threat
values and the cooperative solution. Keeping the information private means that one party
knows some of the values and the other does not. 
91 Ibid.
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the stipulation  of  the  agreement  (e.g.  the  execution  time,  quality
and payment method). It is possible that the terms of the agreement become
not  applicable  since  the  situation  changes,  especially  in  the  long  term.
In this sense, the contracting parties have to pay extra effort to amend these
terms so that the aims of the contract remain. There are also costs of dealing
with  noncompliance  and  breach  of  contract.94 Once  noncompliance
of contract is detected, costs dealing with legal remedies and law suits may
occur.  In  general,  enforcement  costs  are  low  when  violations
of the agreement  are  easy  to  observe  and  punishment  is  cheap
to administer.95
3.3  TRANSACTION  COSTS  REDUCED  BY  COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
It  is  suggested that  the high costs  of  contracting  drive  the  right  holders
to pool their property rights in a collective organization.96 Indeed, certain
kinds of rights cannot be enforced by individual right holders unless they
join  together  for  collective  enforcement.97 As  the  consequence
of establishing  a  collective,  authors  no  longer  enter  the  market
as individuals,  which  empowers  them  more  abilities  than  contracting
individually when negotiating with music publishers and users.98
Proponents  for  collective  management  of  copyright  argue  that
individual  management  of  copyright  is  sometimes  impossible  because  it
imposes too much burden on both the owners and users. They believe that
in  the  face  of  a  vast  number  of  works  and  parallel  uses  (e.g.  public
performance or mechanical  performance,  etc.),  it  is  practically impossible
for individual right holder to record every use of the work.99 For example,
Abada contends that
“as an individual acting alone in today’s society, characterized by the wide
range of  means available  for using works  of  the mind and the frequency
of their  simultaneous  exploitation  both  at  home  and  abroad,  an  author
94 Harrison and Theeuwes (N 88) 91.
95 Cooter and Ulen (N 75) 94.
96 Merges,  RP  1996,  “Contracting  into  Liability  Rules:  Intellectual  Property  Rights  and
Collective Rights Organizations”, California Law Review, vol. 86, pp. 1302.
97 Besen, SM & Kirby, SN 1989, “Compensating Creators of Intellectual Property: Collectives
That Collect”, The RAND Corporation, pp. 2.
98 Watt,  R  2010-2011,  “Copyright  and  Contract  Law:  Economic  Theory  of  Copyright
Contracts”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 18, pp. 202.
99 Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (N 14) 467.
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cannot  effectively  ensure  that  his  rights  are  protected…  authors  must
organize themselves, either at their own initiative or at that of the State,
within bodies that will collectively administer their rights.”100 
Tournier and Joubert also argue that
“… it is obvious that it would be utopian to imagine that an author could
undertake  the  individual  administration  of  each  of  his  musical  works,
even on the territory of the country to which he belongs, and therefore only
collective  administration  of  the  repertoire  of  musical  works  by a  specific
centralizing body is materially, economically and legally practicable.”101
On  the  other  hand,  the  costs  spent  by  potential  users  would  be
considerably high. For example, it is often the case that sellers know more
about  the  quality  of  goods than do buyers.102 In  the  copyright  industry,
sometimes  third  parties  might  conceal  the  information  concerning
the particular  work  (e.g.  impersonating  as  the  author  of  the  work),
which the users are difficult  to find out. This information asymmetry can
disrupt  market  so  much  that  a  social  optimum  cannot  be  achieved.103
Volunteer  exchange  of  information  might  correct  this  defect  of  market
though; this is extremely impractical if people find concealing lucrative. 
Granting  license  has  been  considered  one  of  the  most  costly  aspects
in copyright management though, collective management of copyright can
effectively  handle  this  issue.  Under  collective  management,  there  is
typically  only one CMO, which  grants licenses  to  potential  users  in  one
specific  domain  of  rights.  An  access  to  the  world  repertory  is  possible
through  the  reciprocal  agreement  made  between  one  local  CMO
and its counterparts in other countries.104 This means that users are capable
of using all the works available in different repertoires through one license.
With  right  holders’  information  recorded by the  CMO, the  hurdles  that
involved in the very first stage of licensing (including complex assignment
of partial  legal rights and license  drafting)105 are thus overcome, because
identifying  who  the  proper  parties  to  a  license  are  would  not  become
100 Abada, S 1985, “Collective Administration of Author’s Rights in the Developing Countries”,
Copyright, vol. 21, pp. 314.
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a significant problem.106 Negotiating with a particular user and monitoring
him thus transforms into a way that the collective on behalf of all members
with each of them bearing only a small fraction of the cost negotiates.107
Further,  adoption  of  uniform  or  template  contract  by  CMO  reduces
bargaining  and  enforcement  costs.  It  is  suggested  that  through
standardization of contracts the per-unit cost can be reduced108 and given
contractual terms offered by collecting societies lower the costs of exchange
with users.109 The obligation that under specific conditions CMOs could not
deny granting licenses to potential users imposes legal certainty upon all
involved  parties.  By  requiring  right  holders  and  users  comply
with standard  form  contracts,  users  are  able  to  exploit  copyright  works
with a  fixed  royalty  paid,  thereby  economizing  the  bargaining  costs
of negotiating detailed terms with CMOs accrued otherwise.110 At the same
time,  the  organization's  internal  rules  that  stipulate  tariff  rates  save
on member-to-member  transaction  costs.111 By  relying  on  established
administrative mechanisms, both owners and users find it  easier when it
comes to collection and distribution of royalties.  Moreover, given the fact
that  collecting  societies  are  usually  specialized  in  their  field  of  licensing
and they are sensitive to the interests of the authors, they may tend to lobby
policy makers in order to make the law tilt more towards right holders.112
Thus this internal governance rules and economies of scale in enforcement
combined may fully internalize the deterrence effect of a successfu1 lawsuit
on potential future infringers.113
Collecting  societies  achieve  a  further  reduction  of  transaction  costs
by granting blanket licenses.114 A pricing scheme in which users may face
different  royalty  level  for  licensing  different  works  may  be  unattractive
to users.115 Thus  a  blanket  license  spares  licensees  the  costs  of  access
105 Lemley,  MA 1996-1997,  “The Economics of  Improvement in Intellectual  Property Law”,
Texas Law Review, vol. 75, pp. 1053.
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to the entire  repertoire  and  the  cost  of  every  single  transaction.116
The rationale  of  a  blanket  license  was  delivered  by  the  Supreme  Court
of the United States:
 “Most users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and all
of  the  repertory  of  compositions  and the  owners  want  a  reliable  method
of collecting for  the  use  of  their  copyrights.  Individual  sales  transactions
in this  industry  are  quite  expensive,  as  would  be  individual  monitoring
and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of single composers.”117
CMOs therefore  lower  transaction  costs  by  imposing  low compliance
costs on users and providing a one-stop shop service.118
The  utilization  of  DRM technologies  in  managing  copyrighted  works
by CMOs allows a reduction of transaction costs as well. For example, using
the  technology  of  “trusted  systems”  facilitates  the  cheaply  monitor
of consumer  usage of digital  copies  (e.g.  the  number  of  times  a work is
accessed)  and access  “micro-charges”(e.g.  e-cash account)  for  such usage
as well.119 It is also quite likely that these technical solutions can facilitate
substantially  the  control  of  legal  and  illegal  uses  of  intellectual  goods.
On the  contrary,  although  new  technologies  make  things  much  easier,
collecting  societies  still  take  charge  of  a  number  of  functions  that  new
technologies do not. First of all, collecting societies can help right holders
find potential users. Every day hundreds of millions of users are seeking
appropriate intellectual  works to fulfill  their  needs – either  economically
or psychologically. But the fact is that not all users are capable of finding
a license  that  meets  their  need.  In  some  extreme  cases  even  some
professional  users who believe their  business  legitimate start  their career
without  having  concluded  a  license  agreement.120 Although  the  advent
of some new technologies such as the search engine and data base may help
solve  this  problem  to  some  extent,  for  the  majority  of  works
(i.e., economically  less  popular  works)  it  still  remains  difficult  to  contact
116 Handke and Towse (N 8) 941.
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Economics, vol. 1, pp. 572.
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Ownership”, William & Mary Law Review, vol. 41, pp. 1320.
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2016] Z. Zhang: Rationale of Collective Management Organizations ... 93
with  the  real  right  holders.  With  extensive  documentation  which  keeps
track of detailed information about the works by the collecting societies,
however, the communication between right holders and users can be much
more  facilitated.  In  this  sense,  collecting  societies  also  play  the  role
as the monitor  of  the  entire  cultural  market.121 Copyright  collectives  also
negotiate  license  fees  on  behalf  of  the  right  owners.  Right  holders  are
always at a weaker position in terms of information that they are unfamiliar
with  situations  such  as  transaction  methods,  market  conditions
and transactional  risk.  At  the  same  time,  users  very  often  belong
to international  media giants or are much strong economically than right
holders, leading to a more advantageous position when they are negotiating
license  agreement.  Collecting  societies,  depending  on  their  monopolistic
position derived from the fact that they represent a world repertoire, have
a counterbalance  effect  upon  the  negative  situation  right  holders  face.
Finally,  collecting  societies  enforce  rights.122 The  advent  of  the  Internet
results  in  the  increase  of  the  costs  to  protect  rights  by  individual  right
holder. Right holders have to pay extra money on searching and monitoring
the  enforcement  of  their  rights.  Therefore,  they  will  find  it  unattractive
if the costs to protect their rights prevail the interests they gain by doing so.
As regard to this, copyright collectives
“have the means to build up the reputation, by those who refuse to take out
a license or pay for it, of not letting go”.123
In the meantime, collecting societies are also the representatives of right
holders fighting piracy.
4.  COLLECTIVE  MANAGEMENT  ORGANIZATIONS  IN  THE
FACE OF MONOPOLY
Both the copyright laws and antitrust laws aim at promoting innovation,
nevertheless these two regimes of laws tend to realize  this  goal through
conflicting methods. Copyright laws, on the one hand, grant right holders
a monopolistic right – the exclusive right to perform and to authorize others
to perform their works – in order to incentivize creativity. On the contrary,
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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antitrust  laws enhance  innovation  by removing  restrains  on competition
and thus discouraging monopolization.124
As a matter of fact, although in most countries there are several colleting
societies  there  is  only  one  collective  for  each  category  of  copyright
(e.g. performing rights, reprography rights, etc.).125 Exception can be found
in the U.S.A., where there are three major performing rights organizations
competing  with  each  other  (i.e.  the  American  Society  of  Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC,
Inc. (formerly the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers)). 126
In those  countries  where  there  is  only  one  collective  managing  one
particular  type  of  copyright,  the  issue  of  monopolization  exists.  Several
users groups even filed lawsuits against collecting societies,  alleging they
abused  their  monopolistic  positions.  Inter  alia,  the  CISAC (International
Confederation  of  Societies  of  Authors  and Composers)  case  is  the  most
prominent one.
4.1 THE CISAC CASE
The so-called “CISAC Case” was a competition law case brought by the EU
Commission  against  a  group  of  authors’  societies  in  Europe.  The  case,
which  commenced  with  two  separate  complaints  filed  with  the  EU
Commission by commercial users, focused on the reciprocal representation
agreements  signed  between  these  societies.127 Specifically,  the  first
complaint was filed by RTL Group (German Broadcaster) in 2000 against
German  authors’  society  GEMA’s  refusal  to  grant  a  community-wide
license  for the performing rights it  administers on behalf  of its  members
and foreign authors.128 The  second complaint  was  filed  by Music  Choice
(digital  music  provider)  in  2003  against  CISAC  arguing  that  certain
provisions  in  the  CISAC  Model  Contract  for  reciprocal  representation
prevented societies from granting multi-territory licenses and thus violated
EU competition rules.129
The Commission issued its decision in 2008, which alleged that
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“the  societies  had  engaged  in  concerted  practices  and  illegally  reached
an arrangement  on  the  territorial  scope  of  their  respective  reciprocal
representation agreements.”130
This  arrangement  prevented  the  societies  from  competing  with  one
another in the grant of multi-territorial, multi-repertoire licenses for digital
rights  exploitation  of  performing  rights.131 In  addition,  the  Commission
further argued that
“societies  prevented  authors  from  joining  the  society  of  their  choice
and prevented  each  other  from  issuing  licences  for  their  own  repertoire
outside the territory in which they are based.”132
Upon the decision CISAC delivered its strong opposition and appealed
the decision before the EU General Court. The focal point of these appeals
was  that  CISAC  denied  the  allegation  that  societies  had  engaged
in a concerted  practice  by  coordinating  the  territorial  scope  of  their
reciprocal representation agreements.133
On  April  12,  2013,  the  General  Court  of  the  EU  issued  its  ruling
in the appeal,  which  annulled  the  2008  decision  of  the  EU  Commission.
CISAC  put  forward  the  key  arguments  against  this  decision,  which
contained
“(1)  infringement  of  Article  81  EC and of  Article  253  EC,  in  that  the
Commission has not proved the existence of a concerted practice with regard
to  the  national  territorial  limitations,  and  (2)  in  the  alternative,
infringement of Article 81 EC, in that the concerted practice, even if it were
to exist, would not be restrictive of competition.”134
The  Court  agreed  with  CISAC  on  both  arguments.  With  respect
to the evidential  value  of  the  elements  put  forward  by  the  Commission
to prove the existence of the concerted practice without relying exclusively
on parallel conduct of the collecting societies, the Court confirmed that
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Para.80, Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 12 April 2013.
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“the mere fact that collecting societies met in the context of the activities
managed by the applicant and that there is a certain amount of cooperation
between  them  does  not  constitute,  as  such,  evidence  of  prohibited
concertation. Where the context in which meetings between undertakings
accused of infringing competition law take place shows that those meetings
were necessary to collectively deal  with issues in no way related to such
infringements,  the  Commission  cannot  presume  that  the  object  of  those
meetings was to focus on anti-competitive practices. In that respect, it must
be  observed  that  the  Commission  has  not  provided  any  evidence  that
the meetings  organised  by  the  applicant  concerned  the  restriction
of competition relating to the national territorial limitations.”135
Moreover,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  collecting  societies  acted
in concert for that purpose, the return to national territorial limitations does
not  demonstrate  the  existence  of  concertation  relating  to  the  national
territorial limitations.136
The  Court  also  accepted  that  societies  have  very  good  reasons
to mandate a single society with a local presence in each foreign territory,137
because  to  provide  for  territorial  limitations  in  the  collecting  societies’
reciprocal  representation  agreements  was  a  means  of  ensuring
the effectiveness  of  the  fight  against  the  unauthorized  use  of  musical
works.138 Pursuant to the applicant, the collecting society best able to carry
out the task of managing the general  monitoring of the market  in order
to require users to request licenses, is, for each territory, the local collecting
society,  which  has  the  most  thorough  knowledge  of  the  market
of the country  in  which  it  is  established.139 Additionally,  the  guarantee
that recovers the expenses related to the monitoring which it  carries out,
would be threatened if several collecting societies could grant for the same
territory  licenses  covering  the  same  repertoires.140 The  Court  adopted
CISAC’s  arguments.  Finally,  the  Court  discovered  that  there  were
incentives that a society would not want to organize competition over its
135 Id Para.107.
136 Id Para.110.
137 Oron, G, “CISAC Case: Analysis of Court Ruling”,
<http://www.cisac.org/Newsroom/Articles/CISAC-Case-Analysis-of-Court-Ruling>.
138 Para.140, Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 12 April 2013.
139 Id Para.150.
140 Ibid.
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own  rights  in  a  given  territory  and  thus  opened  the  door
for the development of new multi-territory licensing models.141
The  aim  of  the  Commission  proposing  the  multi-territorial  licensing
(MTL) was to foster competition. With respect to this aim, the Commission
proposed a Directive
“on  collective  management  of  copyright  and  related  rights  and  multi-
territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal
market”,142
of which Title  III  is  aim at  enabling and indeed promoting the granting
by collecting  societies  of  MTL  for  online  rights  in  musical  works.143
The CISAC  decision  in  this  regard  thus  significantly  impacted  upon
the legislative process regarding MTL. It is commented by the Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law that
“a system based on competition in the market  for collective management
services  to  rightholders  has  broken  the  foundations  of  collective  rights
management as it had developed. The previous system emerged because it
adequately  responded  to  the  economic  needs  of  both  rightholders
and users”.144
Therefore,  the  CISAC  decision  undermines  the  Commission’s
justification for the proposed MTL system. On the contrary, it seems that
the national territorial limitations are more favorable as they have presented
more effective outcome, which worth reconsideration.145
141 Oron (N 137).
142 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on collective  management of  copyright and related rights  and multi-territorial  licensing
of rights  in  musical  works  for  online uses  in  the  internal market,  COM(2012)  372 final,
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf>.
In March 20, 2014, the European Commission finally promulgated the official Directives,
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0026&from=EN>.
143 Ibid.
144 Drexl, J, Nerisson, S, Trumpke, F, and Hilty, RM “Comments of the Max Planck Institute
for Intellectual  Property  and  Competition  Law  on  the  Proposal  for  a  Directive
of the European Parliament and of  the Council  on Collective  Management of  Copyright
and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online
Uses in the Internal Market COM (2012)372”, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property
and Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-04, para. 64.
145 Quintais, JP 2013, “The Empire Strikes Back: CISAC Beats Commission in General Court”,
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, pp. 683.
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4.2 THE DILEMMA OF MONOPOLISTIC POSITION OF CMOS
4.2.1 THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF MONOPOLY
Let us discuss the price that a collective will collect under the monopolistic
situation first. Note that the only product that a CMO sells is the license.
Therefore,  the  price  of  a  license  does  have  significant  impact  upon
the supply and demand of intellectual goods. Economic theory tells us that
a  monopolist  like  other  rational  people  will  think  at  the  margin.146
If the marginal cost of granting a license is less than its marginal revenue,
the collective can increase profit by increasing its production. By contrast,
if the  marginal  cost  of  granting  a  license  is  greater  than  its  marginal
revenue,  the  collective  can  raise  profit  by  reducing  production.
Consequently,  the  CMO  adjusts  its  level  of  production  (in  this  sense,
the granting of license) until  the quantity reaches its maximum, at which
marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost.  Thus,  the  monopolist’s  profit-
maximizing  quantity  of  output  is  determined  by  the  intersection
of the marginal-revenue curve and the marginal-cost curve.147
Note that in following the rule for profit maximization, both competitive
and monopolistic  CMOs are alike.  What is  different  is  that the marginal
revenue of a competitive CMO equals its price, while the marginal revenue
of  a  monopolistic  CMO  is  less  than  its  price.148 This  leads  to  the  price
differentiation.  After  the monopoly CMO chooses the quantity of output
that equals marginal revenue and marginal cost, it uses the demand curve
to find  the  highest  price  it  can charge and sell  that  quantity.149 In other
words,  price  equals  marginal  cost  in  competitive  markets  whereas  price
exceeds marginal cost in monopolized markets.150 As a corollary, monopoly
prices  are  widely  considered  to  be  socially  undesirable  because  of  their
alleged  effects  on  income  distribution,  overall  economic  stability,
the allocation of economic resources, and proper business incentives.151
When it comes to the production of the economically efficient number
of intellectual goods, a monopolistic CMO seems unsatisfatorily performed
146 Mankiw (N 44) 319.
147 Ibid.
148 Id 320.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Posner, RA 1968-1969, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation”, Stanford Law Review, vol. 21,
pp. 550.
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in this regard. Besen, Kirby and Salop152 raise the question whether CMOs
should operate as clubs that control the size of their membership or whether
all right holders should be entitled to join the society.153 In their analysis,
they  argue  that  because  the  collecting  society  must  balance  the  decline
in revenue  per  member  as  the  repertoire  of  the  CMO  enlarges  against
the decline in  costs per member as the administrative costs are spreaded
among  members,  the  maximum  surplus  per  member  will  be  achieved
at a point  where  the  effect  of  diminishing  returns  equal  the  effect
of spreading fixed cost.154 As a result,  in a closed monopolistic  collective,
the size  of  the  collective  (that  is,  the  number  of  works  available  to  be
licensed) is supposed to be smaller than the socially efficient scale. In other
words,  the  supply  of  works  will  be  fewer  than  that  of  economically
efficient.155
In the case of an open collective, that is,  a monopoly collective which
opens its  membership and treats all members equally in distributing any
surplus,156 things will change. Under this situation, additional right holders
will  be  attracted  to  join  the  collecting  society  because  of  the  fact  that
the original  members  of  the  collective  receive  an  equal  portion
of the surplus.157 As  membership  rises,  the  scale  of  the  repertoire  rises
as well,  leading  to  the  increase  of  the  license  fee.  The  membership  will
continue to grow until  the revenue per member equals the marginal cost
of a song plus each member’s aliquot share of the administrative costs.158
In this  sense,  the  works  produced will  exceed  the  economically  efficient
level. However, no surplus will be generated for members.159
4.2.2 THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF MONOPOLY
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  sections,  the  general  idea  behind
the proliferation  of  collective  management  of  copyright  is  that,  because
individual  management  of  copyright  is  expensive  and  even impractical,
collective management is the most effective and efficient way for licensing,
collecting  and  distributing  copyrights  and  royalties.  As  a  consequence,
152 Besen, Kirby and Salop (N 11) 390.
153 Handke and Towse (N 8) 942.
154 Besen, Kirby and Salop (N 11) 394.
155 Ibid.
156 Id 396.
157 Ibid.
158 Id 397.
159 Ibid.
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society  is  better  served  by  a  single  seller  in  this  regard.160 Thus,
the argument behind collective management of copyright is that the market
for  managing  such  rights  is  a  natural  monopoly.161 A natural  monopoly
forms when a single entity can supply a good or service to an entire market
at a lower cost than could two or more entities.162 When a natural monopoly
exists,  it  is  believed that  there are economies  of scale  in the monitoring,
licensing,  collecting  and  distributing  of  copyrights,  which  make
the management  of  an  aggregate  of  rights  more  efficient  than
the management of a single or few rights.163 
Economies of scale are decreases in per unit cost resulting from increases
in  quantity  produced or  distributed.164 Some economists  argue that  once
minimum optimal scale is achieved, long run average total cost is constant
over  a  wide  range  of  output,165 thus  leading  to  increases  of  output.
In mesuring  scale  economies,  economists  have  developed  various
measurement  techniques,  namely  product-specific166,  plant-specific167,
and firm-specific168.  In  analyzing  the  operation  of  collecting  societies,
we will apply the firm-specific technique.
First  of  all,  it  is  easily  understandable  that  the  per-work  costs
of monitoring usage and infringement and enfocing the rights tend to be
lower  as  the  number  of  works  increases.169 When  all  related  rights  are
managed  by  a  single  CMO,  the  cost  of  such  behavior  is  the  lowest.
The rationale of this is that the concentration of copyrighted works makes
the costs that every right holder bears lower, this negative relevance reaches
a peak when the extreme case that only one CMO managing all copyrighted
works exists. It is noteworthy that when it comes to economies of scale, only
the fixed costs rather than the variable costs are degressive. Although there
involve  considerable  fixed  costs  that  accrue  during  the  establishing
160 Katz (N 118) 543.
161 Ibid.
162 Mankiw (N 44) 314.
163 Katz (N 118) 553.
164 Laudati,  LL  1980-1981,  “Economies  of  Scale:  Weighing  Operating  Efficiency  When
Enforcing Antitrust Law”, Fordham Law Review, vol. 49, pp. 774.
165 Id 776.
166 Product-specific  economies are  associated with the volume of  any single  product made
and sold. Ibid 779.
167 Plant-specific  real  economies  are  the  decline  of  production  and  distribution  unit  costs
as plant capacity and production increase. Ibid 780.
168 Firm-specific  real  economies  are  the  decline  in  production  and  distribution  unit  costs
as firm size increases. Ibid.
169 Katz (N 118) 556.
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and maintaining  process  of  collective  management,  these  costs  can  be
reduced  on  an  average  basis  through  the  volume  of  produced
transactions.170 Moreover, economies of scale can have a deterreing effect
upon the grant of injuntive relief by the court.171 Note that when individual
right holder seeking an injunctive relief from the court, it is true that this
particular  injuncion  will  only have a prohibitive  effect  upon the specific
work  of  the  owner  rather  than  other  copyrighted  works.  This  means
that the illegal user can continue to use other right holders’ works without
authorization. On the other hand, if the injunction is sought by a collecting
society,  the  result  will  be  that  the  unauthorized  user  will  be  prevented
to use  any  of  the  works  available  in  the  collecting  society’s  repertory
in the future.172 This  mechanism  is  considered  socially  efficient  as  it
facilitates the enforcement of copyright.
4.3 MEANS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF MONOPOLY
The  analysis  above  shows  that  a  monopoly  collective  will  harm
the copyright market from two perspectives. That is, by charging a higher
price  and  by  producing  less  intellectual  works.  Generally  speaking,
to mitigate the negative effect that a monopoly collecting society brings, two
methods can be adopted: bilateral monopoly and regulation.
4.3.1 BILATERAL MONOPOLY
In our previous analysis we know that the monopoly collective sets an all-
or-nothing license  fee. This  means that potential  users only by accepting
the rate set by collective can be granted a license or otherwise they have
to leave.  By  this  ability  that  can  deny  the  licensee  access  to  its  library
the collecting  society  is  able  to  receive  its  entire  value  of  the  license.173
Things  may  change  under  bilateral  monopoly.  A  general  definition
of bilateral monopoly delievered by Druckman and Bonoma is that
“a  situation  where  two  parties  are  forced  to  deal  exclusively  with  one
another  and  to  reach  agreement  in  order  to  derive  any  profit
from the interaction.”174
170 Handke and Towse (N 8) 944.
171 Katz (N 118) 557.
172 Ibid.
173 Besen, Kirby and Salop (N 11) 398.
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When licensees gather in groups negotiate with collectives rather than
individually, their bargaining power increases exponentially to the extent
that a group of licensess can threaten to withhold the contract collectively.
In effect, collective bargaining by potential users creates a situation in which
neither  side  is  able  to  dominate  the  other;  and  the  outcome  will
approximate those expected in a competitive market.175
In his thought provoking article, Professor Richard Friedman proposes
the “bargaining model” to analyze bilateral monopoly. Under this model,
both  parties  in  the  transaction  are  able  to  bargain  about  both  price
and quantity  of the  contract.176 He argues  that  the  way that  both parties
make greater profits is by enlarging the total profit “pie” that they share,177
i.e.,  the number  of transaction rather  than the price  of  the transaction.178
The Pareto  optimal  quantity  will  be  achieved  at  a  point  where  the  joint
profit of the two parties equals the profit that they would make by selling
the  same  amount  of  goods  if  they  merged  into  a  single  monopolist.179
From game theory it is well known that the equilibrium solutions typically
assigns shares of the market surplus to each negotiator on the basis of their
relative  bargaining  powers.  Bileral  monopoly,  then,  is  an  effective  way
in which the market power of the monopolist can be eliminated.180
Bilateral monopoly has long been the case in the UK between the PRS
(Performing  Rights  Society)  and  the  BBC  (British  Broadcasting
Corporation).181 It is reported that without the solidarity of the monopoly
for composers through the PRS, the BBC would probably set a much lower
fee  and  force  the  individual  owners  to  accept.182 Also,  the  monopolistic
power of the collecting society is substantially reduced as a result of the fact
that many users negotiate with the collective through a trade association
174 Druckman, D and Bonoma, TV 1976, “Determinants of Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral
Monopoly Situation II:  Opponent’s Concession Rate and Similarity”,  Behavioral Science,
vol. 21, pp. 252. Also see Friedman, RD 1997, “Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly”,
Journal of Reprints Antitrust Law & Economics, vol. 27, pp. 839.
175 Sobel, LS 1983, “The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the “Economic
Realities” of Blanket Licensing”, Loyola L.A. Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 3, pp. 40.
176 Friedman (N 174) 845-46.
177 Id 846.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
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181 Handke and Towse (N 8) 944.
182 MacQueen, HL and Peacock, A 1995, “Implementing Performing Rights”, Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 19, pp. 166.
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or similar  body.183 Other  illustrations of bilateral  monopoly involve radio
and television stations, and hotels and motels organize into industry-wide
associations.
4.3.2 REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY
Another  way  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  monopoly  is  by  regulating
the behavior  of  monopolistic  collecting  societies.  This  solution  is
particularly  common  in  the  case  of  natural  monopoly.  It  is  generally
acknowledged that the regulatory control of natural monopoly occurs by:
(1) limiting entry; (2) setting prices; (3) controlling profits; and (4) imposing
a service obligation.184
As  mentioned  above,  in  most  countries  there  are  a  limited  number
of collecting  societies  managing  practically  all  categories  of  rights,
where the conditions for the establishment of a new collective are reletively
high.  For  example,  in  China  the  law  has  set  various  requirements
for the establishment of collective organizations, which include: (1) no less
than  50  obligees  who  promote  the  establishment  of  the  organization
for collective  administration  of  copyright;  (2)  the  scope  of  business
of the organization for  collective administration  of copyright  shall  not  be
overlapped  with  that  of  another  lawfully  registered  organization
for collective administration of copyright; (3) the organization for collective
administration of copyright may represent the benefits of relevant obligees
throughout  the  country;  and  (4)  the  organization  for  collective
administration  of  copyright  has  formulated  a  draft  of  its  articles
of association,  a  draft  of  royalty  rates  to  be  charged,  and a  draft  of  the
measures  for  transferring  royalties  to  the  obligees.185 Such  requirements
basically  prevent  most  of  individuals  from  setting  up  new  collecting
societies.  Additionally,  there  are  also  national  laws  (e.g.,  those
of Switzerland  and  Hungary)  that  explicitly  provide  that  only  one
organization  may be  authorized  to  manage the  same right  for  the  same
category of rights owners.186
183 Handke and Towse (N 8) 944.
184 Tomain, J 2001-2002, “The Persistence of Natural Monopoly”,  16 Nat. Resources & Env’t.,
pp. 243.
185 Art.  7,  Regulation  on  the  Collective  Administration  of  Copyright  (adopted  at  the  74th
executive meeting of the State Council on December 22, 2004, and shall come into force
on March 1, 2005).
186 Ficsor (N 2) 136.
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What price should a copyright collective set for a license? This question
is not as easy as it might at first appear. For one thing, finding the logical
socially  optimal  price  is  almost  impossible  in  the  real  life  economies.
For another,  it  is  highly  difficult  to  predict  the  preference  of  consumers
whose varied and fast-changing interest in intellectual goods might divert
from  one  type  of  works  to  another  from  time  to  time.  Actually,  Besen
and Kirby’s  statement  that  ‘One  of  the  great  frustrations  in  conducting
the research for this report has been our inablity to obtain a precise answer
to the question that we asked of many copyright collectives, “How are your
tariffs  determined?”187 delievers  the  difficulty  of  license  pricing.
In the extreme case  whenever  the  bilateral  bargaining  rule  has  not  been
established,  it  is  a reality that copyright collective set the price of license
unilaterally according to the rules of thumb rather than precise information
regarding the actual supply and demand situation of copyrighted works,
or even the costs of marketing the repertoire.188 Given this, perhaps the most
efficient  means that the government can do to regulate license  pricing is
by offering users public subsidies with the goal of helping them organize
together  into  groups  and form stronger  bargaining  powers.  In  addition,
governmental  intervention  of  the  fees  set  by  collecting  societies  is  not
uncommon.189 Examples  include  the  Performing  Right  Tribunal
in the United Kingdom, the Federal  Arbitral  Commission  in  Switzerland,
and  the  German  Patent  Office.190 These  regulatory  bodies  in  some
jurisdictions  would  oversee  the  reasonableness  of  the  fees  set  by  local
copyright collectives whereas in others they would directly set the license
fee if the parties cannot reach an agreement.191 Some commentators suggest
that,  however,  if  the  collecting  societies  themselves  cannot  determine
the price  of  the license,  it  would hardly  be  any easier  for  the  regulators
to set this price.192
With  regard  to  profit  controlling,  it  is  regulated  by  the  majority
of domestic laws that the collecting societies are operated under a not-for
profit basis. After deduction of necessary management costs, the remaining
royalties collected should all be distributed to copyright holders, no portion
187 Besen and Kirby (N 97) 81.
188 Watt (N 57) 193.
189 Ibid.
190 Besen, Kirby and Salop (N 11) 405.
191 Ibid.
192 Handke and Towse (N 8) 944.
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of  the  remuneration  collected  by  such  organizations  should  be  used
forApurposes  other  than  covering  the  actual  costs  of  management
and for the  distribution  fo  the  remaining  amounts  to  the  rights  owners
concerned without the permission of the rights owners.193
Other  than  covering  actual  costs  and  distribution  of  remuneration
to individual rights owners, collective management organizations are also
obliged to fulfill some cultural and social responsibilities. Cultural purposes
mainly  mean the  use  of  certain  amounts  for  the  promotion  of  creativity
(through  prizes,  competitions,  fellowships,  etc.),  while  social  purposes
usually involve the transfer of the money to health insurance or pension
funds.194
As  noted  before,  the  most  valuable  product  that  a  collecting  society
markets  is  a  blanket  license  to  its  repertoire.  By  actively  inflating
the repertoire  of  the  collecting  societies  with  songs,  the  blanket  license
in itself  increases its  value. Some users,195 however, accuse such behavior
of tying196 - which if proven may be a per se violation of the antitrust laws -
since  many  songs  available  in  the  library  are  unwanted  by  the  users.
Such allegation is not uncommon as the users claim that the tying product is
popular songs while the tied product is unpopular songs. This argument,
however, fails upon examination because blanket license lacks the essential
characteristics  of  a  true  tying  arrangement.197 The  reason  for  this  is
that the popular  items  are  not  used  to  market  the  unpopular  ones.198
The royalties  collected by collectives  are  distributed  on the  basis  of  use.
In other words, the less popular song will receive less revenue and the song
that  is  not  used  at  all  will  earn  no  revenue.  Consequently,  collecting
societies do not increase the sale of less popular goods by marketing blanket
license. As a matter of fact, collectives nowadays would specialize as much
193 Ficsor (N 2) 149.
194 Id 149-50.
195 CBS v ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev’d, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d
sub nom. BMI v CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
196 According to Professor Maralee Buttery, tying involves three elements: two distinct items
must  be  sold  on  terms that  condition  the  sale  of  the  first  product  (the  tying  product)
on the sale of the second, inferior product (the tied product); the seller has sufficient market
power  for  the  tying  product  to  restrain  competition  in  the  tied  product  market;
a “not insubstantial”  amount  of  commerce  must  be  affected  by  the  arrangement.
See Buttery, M 1983, “Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and Encouragement
of Artistic Endeavor”, Columbia Law Review, vol. 83, pp. 1269.
197 Buttery (N 196) 1270.
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as the set of users is specialized.199 For example, collecting societies will fine
tune their repertoire to offer blanket license to their users relying on their
specific requirements.200
5. CONCLUSION
Collective  management of copyright  provides  an efficient  means  to cure
the problem  brought  by  the  public  goods  characteristics  of  copyright.
Under the arrangement of blanket license, users become much easier to get
a use permit which involves all the materials they want to use. Free riding is
thus  eliminated  to  a  large  extent  because  potential  infringers  find  that
the costs of infringement will be higher than the costs of acquiring a license.
By exploiting economies of scale, collective management organizations
are  capable  of  pooling  the  high  transaction  costs  among their  members
and uers.  Hereby  CMOs  make  licensing  cheaper  and  further  facilitate
the markets for copyrights. This saving of costs can thus be channeled into
foundation  which  assists  the  creation  of  more  new  works  as  well
as the dissemination of culture.
In  economic  terms,  the  collecting  society  is  likely  to  be  a  natural
monopoly.  How to  regulate  a  natural  monopoly  effectively  still  remains
questionable.  Is  leaving  the  collectives  in  tact  and  at  the  same  time
regulating their  behaviors the most  feasible  way? If  so,  whether  directly
or indirectly  regulation  is  more  suitable?  How  much  governmental
intervention is enough? These questions are still left unanswered. Perhaps
Professor  Fabrice  Rochelandet’s  empirical  study  which  shows
that copyright  collectives  that  are  strongly  controled  outperform  those
intermediarily and relatively weak controled201 may provide us with some
insights.
199 Watt (N 57) 191.
200 That is to say some collecting societies will offer blanket licenses to pop music while others
will offer blanket licenses to country music. Ibid.
201 Rochelandet,  F  2003,  “Are  Copyright  Collecting  Societies  Efficient  Organizations?
An Evaluation  of  Collective  Administration  of  Copyright  in  Europe”,  in  Gordon,  WJ
and Watt, R (eds.), The Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and Analysis, Edward
Elgar, pp. 192.
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